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ABSTRACT
The ineffectiveness of real devaluation as stabilization policy does
not imply that the nominal exchange rate should be held constant in the
face of a domestic inflation. tn this circumstance, import duties and
export subsidies would have to be escalated to counter the potential
erosion of the trade balance. This escalation of trade barriers
generates a rising black market premium and offers increasing incentives
to smuggling, already a pervasive problem in the African countries. Asa
consequence, the central bank would find it more and more difficult to
hold the nominal exchange rate constant. This leads us to considera
passive exchange rate policy of stabilizing the real exchange rate by
moving the nominal rate in line with domestic inflation.
If such passive policy is not accompanied by the elimination of
trade barriers, however, the black market premium will not disappear.
Unless exchange rate policy and trade policy are consistent with each
other, the smuggler's blues will reach the central bank. Indeed, this is
not just a theoretical possibility, it is the major lesson from the
recent experience of Sudan.
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I. Introduction: Real Devaluation and the Trade Balance
The usual analysis of the effects of real devaluation on trade flows
assumes a high degree of substitutability among final goods in corisuinp—
tion and among uses of inputs in production. Thus the typical analysis
assumes that all goods are final goods with domestic production of
import-competing goods and domestic consumption of exportables. A real
devaluation, by reducing the relative price of domestic output, encourag-
es substitution from imports to home goods in consumption, and from pro-
duction for the home market to production for export. This high degree
of substitutability is usually reflected in an assumption that import
demand and export supply both have high elasticities with respect to the
real exchange rate. The result is a presumption that real devaluation
will improve the trade balance.
The structure of trade in same developing countries, especially in
sub-Saharan Africa, suggests a different analysis and result, however.
This was previously argued by Branson (1985) in the case of Kenya, and is
also applicable in Sudan. These countries have as a high proportion of
their imports intermediate inputs (such as oil) and capital equipment.
In Sudan, this proportion is approximately 80%. These are inputs into a
production structure that is to some degree rigidified by the existing
capital stock, reducing the short-run price elasticity of demand for
imports. These countries' exports are dominated by agricultural output
whose supply is inelastic in the shortrun. In both Kenya and Sudan, 90%
of exports are agricultural goods.
With inelastic import demand and export supply, a real devaluation
will tend to expand export revenues and import receipts proportionately
to their initial values in home currency, while leaving them unchanged in-3-
foreign exchange. If the trade balance is initially in deficit, the real
devaluation may increase the deficit in home currency, deflating domestic
demand, with little gain in foreign exchange. This makes real devalua-
tion potentially counterproductive as part of a stabilization program.
This ineffectiveness of real devaluation as stabilization policy
does not imply that the nominal exchange rate should be held constant in
the face of a domestic inflation, however. In this circumstance, import
duties and export subsidies would have to be escalated to counter the
potential erosion of the trade balance. This escalation of trade barri-
ers generates a rising black market premium and offers increasing
incentives to smuggling, already a pervasive problem in the African
countries. As a consequence, the central bank would find it more and
more difficult to hold the nominal exchange rate constant. This leads us
to consider a passive exchange rate policy of stabilizing the real
exchange rate by moving the nominal rate in line with domestic inflation.
If such passive policy is not accompanied by the elimination of
trade barriers, however, the black market premium will not disappear.
Unless exchange rate policy and trade policy are consistent with each
other, the smuggler's blues will reach the central bank. Indeed, this is
not just a theoretical possibility, it is the major lesson from the
recent experience of Sudan.
The following section presents a basic model of the trade balance.
In this context, we show the consequences of rigidity in import demand
and export supply. We note as a by-product that wage indexation can
introduce a rigidity that replicates the results with inelastic export
supply and import demand.-4-
Sections III and IV of the paper analyze the interaction of trade
barriers, smuggling and the black market premium. We first introduce
domestic inflation and trade barriers, to show the necessary escalation
of the latter to maintain the trade balance with a fixed nominal exchange
rate. We then show the effect of smuggling on legal as well as total
trade, and relate the rate of increase in the black market premium to the
rate of escalation of trade barriers. With a passive exchange rate
policy and a constant level of trade barriers, the black market premium
will be constant. We finally introduce capital account considerations,
showing they exacerbate the rise in the premium if the unreported trade
balance is in surplus, and conversely.
Section V applies the analysis to recent policy in Sudan.—5—
II. Devaluation in the "Rigid" Economy
In this section we layout a simple model of export and import supply
and demand that illustrates the problems of the "rigid" economy. The
model is essentially the same as the one sketched in Branson (1972) and
developed in Branson and Katseli (1982). The duality with wage
indexation can also be easily demonstrated in this framework.
Export supply and demand can be described by the following two
log-linear equations, normalized on the home-currency price of exports p
for supply and the foreign-exchange price q for demand.
—1 S (1)Supply: ln =lnp +sin X
-l d (2) Demand: ln q =lnq -dln X
Here X is the quantity of exports, p is the cost of production of home
goods, and q is the cost of foreign substitutes for our exports. We can
interpret p as the opportunity cost of exports in the home economy;
later we will identify the rate of growth ofp as the domestic inflation
rate. Foreign inflation would be interpreted as growth in q. Stating
export supply in terms of the home currency price reflects the assumption
that costs of producing exports are given in home currency. Stating
demand in terms of the foreign exchange price reflects the assumption
that exports compete with foreign goods in demand.
Supply and demand in the export market are brought together by the
exchange rate as "translator" between and q:
(3) Translator: in =ine +inq.-6-
The exchange rate is stated in terms of units of homecurrency per
unit of foreign exchange: an increase in e is a devaluation of thehome
currency.
The export supply and demand model of equations (l)-(3)can be used
to track movements of export price and quantity as functions of the
domestic inflation rate p, the foreign inflation rateq, and changes in
nominal exchange rate .Totaldifferentiation of equations (1) -(3)
gives the solutions for and X.
(4) x k Ce + q) + (1 -k)p ;Export price.
(5) X =ksCe + q -p) ; Export quantity.
Here the parameter kd lCd ÷ s) > 0. The movement in the home-
currency price of exports is a weighted average of foreign influences
(e + q) and home influences p .Alternatively,the relative price of
exports in terms of home goods p/p is proportional to the real exchange
rate E =eq/p,and the same is true of the quantity of exports. If the
economy is "small" in the export market, dx -and k -1also, so that
there are no home influences on relative prices and X =sE.
If we impose the "rigid" economy assumption thatSx =0,export
revenue is fixed in foreign exchange. In home currency, export revenue
moves proportionately to the change in e, withp and q constant:
(6)—7—
The duality result with domestic wage indexation can be obtained by
assuming that p =e+qwith devaluation. This would be the result if
non-traded goods prices were a mark-up over wages, and wages are indexed
to the CPI. See Branson (1985) for the derivation. With p =e+q
from equations (4) and (5) we obtain again the result in equation (6).
This is the duality between wage indexation as commonly practiced in
Western Europe and the rigidity of s =0,which may be more relevant in
Africa.
We can re-interpret the duality result in a scenario of an on-going
domestic inflation with p =therate of growth of domestic money. If
the economy is rigid, there is no fall in export quantity. However, the
profit squeeze that follows from the fall in p/p indicates that in the
long run resources will exit the export-producing sector.
The "passivet' exchange rate policy sets e p =themoney
growth rate, with q assumed to be zero. This holds the quantity X con-
stant with e =pin equation (5). The home-currency price of exports
rises at the same rate as p; from (4) with k =1, =e=p.
This holds p/p constant, preventing the profit squeeze in the
export sector. The result is that the passive exchange-rate policy with
e =p"insulates" the exportable sector from the domestic inflation.
The analysis for imports follows by analogy, except that the
relevant rigidity is on the demand side. Import demand and supply are
given by
-1 d
(7) Demand: ln p =inp -din M
—1 S (8)Supply: in=lnq +S inN-8-
Here p represents competition from import-competing homegoods, and q
represents foreign costs of production of imports. The small-country
assumption sets S =, whereas,in the "rigid" economy, d =0.The
translator between p andq gives us the third equation,
(9) Translator: in p in e + inq.
The solutions for changes in import price andquantity m and M are
obtained from total differentiation of equations (7) -(9).They are:
(10) ;m =k(e+ q) + (i_k);n
(11) M =- kd(e+ q -p),
where k's/(s+d). The formal analogy to the export solutions is
obvious. In the small country, k' -1as Sm -. Inthe "rigid"
economy, d =0and k' =1also. Thus the rise in import payments is
equal to the devaluation. The same result can be obtained by again
imposing p =ein equations (10) and (11).
The duality result can be obtained by again imposingp =e
in equations (10) and (11). As in the exportcase, this result can be
reinterpreted to study the effects of a passive exchange-rate policy in
the face of domestic inflation. With an infinitely-elasticsupply of
imports, the rise in domestic costs relative to import prices,n'm'
squeezes profits in the import-competing sectors. If the economy is
"rigid," there is no increase in the quantity of imports in the short
run. But the profit squeeze in the import-competing sector, to the
extent it exists, would augur a longer-run rise in imports.-9—
A passive policy that sets e =p
releases this pressure.
The home—currency import price p rises at the same rate as
from (10) with k = p e =p.This holds p/p constant,
eliminating the profit squeeze in the import-competing industries, actual
or potential.
Combining the equations for import payments and for export receipts,
both in terms of home currency, we see that in the "rigid" economy they
increase in proportion to the change in the exchange rate. This means
that the increase in import payments exceeds that in export receipts if
the trade balance showed a deficit at the time of devaluation. So in the
"rigid" economy, real devaluation may be counter-productive. However,
the passive policy would hold a balanced trade position in the face of a
domestic inflation, with the quantities of exports and imports constant:
(12) p +X=
;m
+N== e; devaluation in the "rigid" economy.
Here, there is no movement in the foreign-exchange trade balance,
regardless of the initial condition: the passive policy insulates the
trade balance from the domestic inflation. This may be about the best we
can expect exchange-rate policy to do in a "rigid" economy.-10-
111. Fixed Exchange Rates and Trade Barriers
An alternative to the passive policy of moving the exchange rate
with domestic inflation is to hold the nominal exchange rate constant and
use escalating trade barriers to offset the effect on trade quantities.
The basic idea is that rising import duties and export subsidies could
offset the effects on resource allocation from the increasing divergence
between non-traded goods prices and export and import prices.
The model of export supply and demand is modified by introduction of
a subsidy on top of the export price received by the seller. We
illustrate the case with ad valorem subsidy at rate s that multiplies the
export price by a subsidy factor a =1+s.Thus the price actually
r-ceived by exporters is ap,, andexport supply becomes:
(13) in in a =inn +
Equilibriumin the export market is shown in Figure 1. The demand
curve is equation (2) of section II in non-log, or exponential, form.
The underlying supply curve, the one without a a term, is equation (1).
The subsidy factor ashiftsthis supply curve down to give the
equilibrium intersection at E0. This shows a higher export volume and a
combination of a lower price paid by the buyer abroad and higher price
inclusive of the subsidy received by the home producer
than at the unsubsidized equilibrium E0. The figure shows that if
p, the domestic price, is rising due to domestic inflation and if the
nominal exchange rate e is constant, the export subsidy a must rise at
the same rate to hold the quantity X0 constant.
This result implies an increasing rate of growth of the actualpx
—lOa—
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subsidy rate, since a =s/(1+s),where s is the increase in the
subsidy rate. The need for an increasing subsidy rate to provide a
constant rate of growth of the subsidy factor can be seen from a simple
example. If initially s =0,imposition of a 10% subsidy will yield an
increase of 10% in a. But if the subsidy rate is 50%, so a =1.5,to
increase a by 10%, s will have to increase from 0.50 to 0.65, or 30%.
The equilibrium between export demand and subsidized supply in
equation (13), (2) and (3), and in Figure 1, is expressed in equations
(14) and (15) for changes in export quantity and market price net of
subsidy:
(14)p, =kCe +q)+(1-k)(p-a),
(15)X =ks[(e
+q)-(p
-a)].
The subsidy factor a enters both solutions in tandem with the domestic
price index p. If an inflation driven by domestic money growth or other
domestic factors is driving the domestic price index p, and policy keeps
the nominal exchange rate e constant, then a growth rate of the export
subsidy factor a that equals the rate of inflation p would be needed to
hold the quantity of exports X constant.
Thus in an environment of domestic inflation with rapid monetary
growth, a policy of fixing the nominal exchange rate would destabilize
the real exchange rate E; in particular, if p grows rapidly, an attempt
to fix the nominal rate would yield a real appreciation of the exchange
rate and shrinking exports. As we see below, this has been the policy-12-
response in Sudan- -stabilizing the nominal rate against movements in the
real rate.
A regime that attempts to eliminate the effects of stabilizing the
nominal rate in the face of a major appreciation of the real rate
requires, from equations (14) and (15), a rate of increase of the export
subsidy factor equal to the domestic inflation. The subsidy factor a
would have to rise at the domestic inflation rate p to hold X =X
n 0
in Figure 1. The subsidy rate itself would have to grow at an
increasing rate to provide a= Thiswould, of course, create an
ever—increasing incentive to false invoice sales as exports to obtain the
subsidy. This is part of the problem we see in developing countries
attempting to hold nominal exchange rates in the face of domestic
inflation. The policy increases incentives to move transactions to the
illegal sector.
The movement in an import tariff needed to hold the quantity of
imports constant in the face of a domestic inflation with a fixed nominal
exchange rate can be shown by analogy to the export subsidy model. With
an import tariff, import demand becomes:
(16)in m + in t =lnp -d1lnNd.
The demand curve gives the total price in home-currency that
importers pay, inclusive of the tariff factor t =1+ t.In equation
(16), p is the home—currency price the sellers of imports receive, t is
the ad-valorem tariff rate added by the government and tPm is the price
paid by the domestic purchaser.-13-
The equilibrium in the import market with the import tariff factor t
is shown in Figure 2. The supply curve is equation (8) in section II in
exponential, or non-log, form. The non-tariff demand curve without a t
term is the demand curve of equation (7). These would yield the non-
tariff equilibrium E0. The tariff factor t shifts the demand curve
inclusive of the tariff down, giving the tariff-inclusive equilibrium at
E0. This shows a lower import quantity H0thanwithout the tariff, with
a lower price received by the seller p, and a higher price paid by the
domestic buyer tPm•
It is clear from Figure 2 that for a given foreign price indexq,
tariff factor t and exchange rate e, an increase in domestic prices
represented by p would shift the demand curves up, increasing import
prices and quantities. To prevent the increase in import quantity in
the face of a domestic inflation given by p, the tariff factor t
would have to increase at the same rate. This would hold M at H asp 0 n
increases. So, analogously to the export case, the import tariff factor
t would have to grow at the same rate as domestic inflation to hold the
quantity of imports constant.
As in the export case, a constant growth rate of the tariff factor t
requires an increasing rate of increase in the actual tariff rate, since
t =t/(1+t).To achieve a 10% increase in the tariff factor t (to
offset a 10% domestic inflation), if initially t0 (no tariff), a 10%
tariff will do. If initially t =0.50,a 30% increase is needed.
The equilibrium between import supply and demand inclusive of the
tariff in equations (16), (8), and (9), and in Figure 2, is expressed in
equations (17) and (18) for changes in import quantity and market price
net of the import tariff:—13a—
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(17) m =k(e+q)+(1
-k)(p_t),
(18)N =-kd[(e+ q) -(p-t)}.
The tariff factor t enters both equations in tandem with domestic
inflation p. With a domestic inflation driven by money growth and with
a fixed exchange rate, a growth of the tariff factor r equal to the
inflation rate would be needed to hold the quantity of imports H
constant.
Consider now the quota alternative to the tariff of Figure 2. If
the domestic price level is rising, the non-tariff demand curve shiftsup
continuously. If a quota of H0 is imposed, the gap between the
d—1 s—i m . . m demand price given by PmM and the supply price given by eq M grows
continuously. This gap is the same as the tariff wedge tPm
Thus in an environment of a domestic inflation characterized by
ri
both the tariff and the subsidy factors would have to grow at the same
rate given to hold trade quantities constant with a fixed nominal
exchange rate. If tariffs and subsidies grow more slowly, import
quantity will rise and export quantity fall. But, with the tariff and
subsidy factors growing at the domestic inflation rate
(a =t=p),the regime with a fixed nominal exchange rate would offer
ever-increasing incentives to smuggling, through false invoicing or other
means. This, in turn, would generate a rising black market premium,
which would make it unsustainable to fix the nominal exchange rate.-15-
IV. Trade Barriers, Smuggling and the Black Market Premium
Rising import tariffs induce smuggling and therefore provide an
extra obstacle to the fixed nominal rate policy. An importer will tend
to smuggle if the tariff is so high that it pays to purchase foreign
exchange in the black market at a premium it = eb/e greater than one,
given that the good imported may be confiscated by the government.
Denoting the probability of success in smuggling by z, if z t > it, the
importer will tend to smuggle more. We assume that the probability of
success depends on the ratio of smuggled to legal imports, denoted by m =
S/Lso that, given trade barriers and the premium, an importer will
choosemsuch that expected profits are maximized. Associated with the
optimal m, there will be a probability of success z(m) and a domestic
price which can be expressed as a weighted average of the tariff factor
and the premium, with r>it a necessary condition for import smuggling to
occur. Rising subsidies, on the other hand, reduce the incentive to
smuggle exports but if the subsidy is smaller than the black market
premium weighted by the probability of success, or 'Y < Z it, it will pay
to smuggle more. Profits will be maximized for a smuggling ratio x
S/L, associated to a probability of success z(x) and a domestic price
of exports which can also be expressed as a weighted average of the
subsidy factor and the premium, with a < it a necessary condition for
export smuggling to occur. As a consequence, smuggling requires that t >
a initially, a condition which is necessarily met when we have an export
tax since then a < 1. The nature of the smuggling equilibrium is
discussed in Macedo (1985), and can be adapted to our purposes.-16-
Domestic prices, net of tariff or subsidy, differ from the domestic
currency value of foreign prices at the official exchange rate by the
difference between the premium and trade barriers:
(19)
where =nx z(x)/[cl + it x z(x)]
(20) ;m =e+ -
wherem =nm/Ct +itm).
Wenow interpret planned smuggled imports as flow demand for black
market foreign exchange and successfully smuggled imports as flow supply
of black market foreign exchange. This determines the long-run black
market premium consistent with balanced legal and illegal trade. As
before, we set foreign prices q at unity, then if legal exports equal
legal imports (L =Lm)and successfully smuggled exports pay for planned
smuggling imports (Z(X)S =S),the smuggling ratios must satisfy the
trade balance equilibrium are such that:
(21) z(x) x =m
Using (21) to solve for the black market premium and the smuggling
ratios in terms of trade barriers, it can be shown that these only depend
on the ratio p =t/a,with a coefficient capturing the inverse of the sum
of the elasticities of the demand for and supply of black market foreign
exchange with respect to trade barriers. An increase in t increases—17—
smuggling only if a does not increase in proportion. The premium,
however, increases with both, since it is a weighted average of tanda.
It can be expressed as:
(22) Tt =t - m'mx1
where c(a) is the elasticity of demand for (supply of) black
market foreign exchange.
Using (22) in (19) and (20), it is seen that an increase in the
tariff (subsidy) raises (lowers) the domestic net price of exports and
lowers (raises) the domestic net price of imports because of the induced
increase (decrease) in smuggling. Note also that in the benchmark case
where t= a=it=1,thecoefficients become the share of import
smuggling (or of successful export smuggling) in total trade, denoted by
We can then write the condition for the smuggling equilibrium to
exist as > >
x o m
The smuggling model summarized above can now be adapted to the model
of section III. Under the simplifying assumption that the government
does not resell confiscated smuggled goods, exports supplied by home
producers (XS) are greater than exports demanded by foreign consumers
0
(X )andgreater than legal exports (L) whereas imports demanded by home
consumers (Md) are smaller than imports supplied by foreign producers
(MS) but still greater than legal imports CL). Since the differences
involve the smuggling ratios for and N5 and those multiplied by the
probability of success in smuggling for X5 and Md,they can be expressed
as a function of the ratio of trade barriers:-18-
(23) =L+x1xm1
(24) = +
(25) MS= L[o/xam)IP
(26) =L+[/(a+cr)]p
Theequality of the wedge between between exports demanded and legal
exports on the one hand and between imports supplied and legal imports on
the other is a consequence of the long-run equilibrium condition
expressed in (21).
Before substituting for quantities in the log differential of the
demand and supply equations from sections II and III and solving the
model for prices and legal quantities, we note that the solution will be
the same as above if p =0,so that the rule Pu =t = astill keeps total
import and export quantities constant. The difference, of course, is
that the black market premium is growing at the same rate=
independentlyof the changes in the official exchange rate.
It is convenient to write the solution relative to the no-smuggling
model of section III, denoted by a L superscript. We then have:
(27) p =+ A[(1+ad)-
(28) L' =jL+Al[d(aS_1)
-s]p
where A =(a+a )(d+s ) xx m xx—19-
(29) =- A(1s) -
(30) 1m =tiL+Am1[mSm(dmam_1) _dmJP
where A =(c+a )(d+s ).
mx m mm
We see that the price of exports is always higher than without
smuggling, and, in the case of a small economy, the price of imports also
increases with rising tariffs. Quantities legally traded are ambiguous.
In the "rigid" economy, legal trade falls but a rise in the value of
imports and exports requires that the foreign exchange elasticities be
greater than one:
(31) +- p-= x'xmx
(32) m
+L--= mxm)1m1
Independently of legal trade, total trade may rise or fall, except
of course for the small, rigid economy. Thus
(33) =+ xm)'[xo11 +ksx]p
(34) Md =ML+(a+am'[ mo)(1l(') +
Itis seen that for the small country total trade rises. The only
case where this would not obtain is for a country with monopoly power on
the import side, say k'O. A country with monopoly power on the export
side would still increase its total exports relative to the no-smuggling
situation.-20-
The smuggling model shows therefore that, even in the "rigid"
economy, legal trade will only fall if tariffs are rising faster than
subsidies. However, the black market premium will be growing at thesame
rate as trade barriers.
To analyze this phenomenon we need to model the short-run black
market premium, which importers and exporters take as given because it
makes the stock of black market foreign exchange willingly held, as in
Macedo (1982).
In this connection, the importance of a given short-term premium is
that in order for smuggling to exist, it must be such that t > Tt > a.
Alternatively put, the observed premium provides a lower bound for import
tariffs and an upper bound for export subsidies.
The analysis is in Macedo (1985). For our purposes, it is
sufficient to stress that if the reported trade balance is zero, the
unreported trade balance in foreign currency is given by:
(35) B "
QmSmk
-- (1-a)r].
When the premium is higher than the weighted average of trade
barriers, the unreported balance is in surplus and conversely. The
effect of capital flight is therefore to exacerbate the rise in the
premium.-21—
V. Lessons from Sudan
Exchange-rate stability is desirable in a developing country because
it eliminates a major source of uncertainty as the traded-goods sectors
develop. As we saw above, an attempt to stabilize the nominal exchange
rate in the face of domestic inflation will require increasing trade
restrictions and the rising incentives they provide for illegal activity.
An alternative objective is stabilization of the real exchange rate so as
to insulate the traded-goods sectors and the trade balance from domestic
inflation. To stabilize the real exchange rate, the nominal rate e
should be moved to offset the home inflation differential. For a con-
stant E, the nominal rate e would follow the rule
(36) ep-q
Once we have accepted, on principle, that the objective for
exchange-rate stabilization is the real exchange rate, we face the
question: to which nominal rate do we apply the rule given in equation
(36)? The dollar rate? The sterling rate? An average? Do we use
import or export weights in forming the average? The general answer to
these questions is that the real effective exchange rate can be
stabilized by applying the rule of equation (36) to a nominal effective
note, where the same set of weights is used in calculating the effective
nominal rate e and the effective traded-goods price q. The optimal
choice of weights is discussed in some detail in Branson and Katseli
(1982). In the absence of market power in either export or import mar-
kets for a small country like Sudan, the appropriate choice is likely to
be total trade weights. Thus the nominal effective rate and traded-goods-22-
price can be formed by making a weighted average across thesumof
exports and imports by trading partner. The nominal exchange rate ofa
selected nulneraire currency such as the U.S. dollarcan then be moved so
that the effective nominal rate follows equation (36).
The data on official effective exchange rates for the Sudanare
summarized in Appendix Tables 1-3. The left-hand side of each Table
shows the export, import, and total trade weights for the Sudan'sfifteen
largest trading partners, with data drawn from the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Appendix Table 1 gives theweighted
relative price index p/q (1980 =100)for the Sudan using export,
import, and total trade weights, and a three-country approximation
weighting Saudi Arabia by .5 and the U.S. and U.K. by .25 each. Appendix
Table 2 gives the same calculation for the nominal effectiverate e, and
Appendix Table 3 (and Figure 3) shows the real effective rate E. In both
tables, an increase in the exchange rate index is an appreciation.
After two decades of relative price stability, the relativeprice
index in Appendix Table 1 goes from 60 in 1976 to 64 in 1977 and 73 in
1978. This was the beginning of a period of accelerating inflation. As
the inflation began in 1977, the nominal rate was not allowed tomove
until 1978. Subsequently, it was increased (depreciation of the Sudanese
currency) in irregular jumps, compared to the fairly smooth relative
inflation path.
The combination of steadily accelerating inflation and irregular
movement of the nominal exchange rate resulted in the unstable movement
in the real effective rate, as shown in Figure 3. After the late 1960s,
the real effective rate fell in an unstable manner to 1980. This real
appreciation was bad for output of traded goods and the trade balance.I,
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The instability of year-to-year movement in the real rate raises risk and
may reduce investment in the traded-goods sector.
The situation worsened after 1980. A sharp real appreciation came
in 1981 as the nominal rate was held nearly constant against a rising
domestic inflation. The sharp devaluation in 1982 gave a large deprecia-
tion in the real effective rate, and the nominal appreciation (!) in 1984
resulted in an appreciation of the real rate back to its level in 1980.
While the causes of the accelerated inflation of the seventies are
controversial, it is worth recalling that, after the first oil crisis,
the Sudanese authorities embarked on a development program designed to
make their country the "bread basket" of the Gulf states. The eagerness
of these states to provide development aid to the Sudan as well as the
significant migration of Sudanese workers toward the Gulf would seem to
have relaxed the foreign exchange constraint. Nevertheless, when Sudan
negotiated with the fliP in 1978, it was already in a very difficult
financial situation. Nashashibi (1980) illustrates the decline in the
competitiveness of major crops in the mid-seventies. Hussain and
Thirwall (1984) find the same tendency after the 1978 devaluation. It is
as yet unclear whether the deterioriation of Sudan's solvency in seven
years of agreements with the IMF is mostly attributable to errors in
policy and/or policy advice. An alternative hypothesis, put forth by
Brown (1984, 1985), argues that both the United States and the Arab
countries managed to use the IMF's "seal of approval" to continue lending
to a friendly government. The ability of Sudan to continue dealing with
the lilY despite arrears on its debt to the Fund is, of course, consistent
with Brown's hypothesis but is not sufficient to establish it. In any
event, the situation did deteriorate until negotiations with the HIP—23a—
FIGURE 4
The bubble of early 1985
Note: Dealers closed on February 10 and official rate was changed from
130 to 250 Pt 1$.
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broke down in late 1984. In early February 1986, the fliP announced it
was ceasing to lend to Sudan.
The 1979 partial unification, rather than part of any agreement,
seems to have been an initiative of the Sudanese authorities. The
financial liberalization which accompanied the partial unification of the
exchange rate turned out to have very severe consequences because, while
broadening the market where a free exchange rate was determined, it did
not induce a more credible official exchange rate policy. As a
consequence, the free market premium became a signal of the inability of
the authorities to manage the economy and was accordingly viewed with
suspicion by the central bank. This may well have exacerbated the
potential of informal financial markets for bubbles and crashes, as
indeed became reality in 1984-85 (see Figure 4).
Going back to the reforms, they continued to be implemented in 1980
and 1981. Further measures toward "the simplification and unification of
the exchange rate" are mentioned in the Annual Report of the Bank of
Sudan (1980, p. 50). In September, according to Awad (1985), the
official rate became 60 piastres per dollar, the special rate 80 piastres
while the free market rate was at 125 piastres, a premium of 2.08, much
higher than the average of 1.76 reported in Table 1.
The unification of the exchange system is dated in BS (1981) in
November 1981, at a rate of 90 piastres per dollar. According to Awad
(1985), the premium was then 1.5, whereas a USAID document reports no
premium (i.e. 1.0).
But the unification only lasted a few months. In March 1982, the
commercial rate rose to 135 piastres, only slightly below the free market
rate of 145. In November, the official rate was set at 130 piastres and—24 a—
Table 1
Exchange Rates in the Sudan
(1973-84 yearly averages)
1976 =100
free CPI
Piastres/Dollar market relative real rates
official free premium to U.S. official free
1973 35 64 1.83 80 125 121
1974 35 67 1.91 91 110 112
1975 35 74 2.11 104 96 108
1976 35 66 1.89 100 100 100
1977 35 66 1.89 108 93 93
1978 38 72 1.89 120 91 91
1979 42 77 1.83 142 85 82
1980 50 88 1.76 156 92 85
1981 53 103 1.94 178 85 88
1982 94 143 1.52 209 129 104
1983 130 193 1.48 264 141 111
1984 130 244 1.88 303 122 122
Sources. official, consumer prices IFS
free 1973-1978 Picks's Currency Yearbook, average of monthly
data
1979-1984 Bank of Sudan, average of daily data.-25-
the commercial rate at 175, again very close to the free market rate.
While the official rate remained at that level until February 1985 (when
it became 250 piastres) the commercial rate was raised to 180 piastres in
March of 1983, BS (1983, P. 64) and to 210 piastres in October 1984.
Before that, however, the official rate was only applicable to the
imports of petroleum and some pharmaceuticals because agricultural
exports were valued at a combined rate of 142 piastres (obtained by
weighing the official rate with 3/4 and the commercial rate with U.
Indeed,by then, the commercial rate itself was only applicable to
specific "priority" imports.
While during the IMP-period there continued to be continuous changes
in exchange rate policy, the major difference with the previous period is
the decline in the premium and the real devaluation against the dollar.
This started in 1979 for the free market exchange rate and continued
until 1984. For the official rate, it is limited to the period
1981-1983. But, as before, the shift of transactions to the commercial
rate makes the true pattern look less volatile than the numbers reported
in Table 1 above.
The "strong dollar" also causes problems of interpretation, but both
the 15 partner real effective exchange rate (using total trade weights)
and the simplified three partner rate mirror the evolution of the
official real dollar rate. There is of course a difference in magnitude.
To a real depreciation of 66% against the dollar in 1982-83, corresponds
a 40% depreciation against major trading partners. The real appreciation
of 1984 is also much larger relative to trading partners (15:23%, 3:20%)
than relative to the dollar (-13%). The free rate, on the other hand,-26-
depreciated by 10% in real terms, underscoring the substantial increase
in the average premium over the years, to almost 1.9.
The decline in the premium during the period of IMF devaluations was
consistent with a smoother functioning of the free market than the
authorities were willing to acknowledge.
Almost by definition, there is little information on quantities
transacted in the free, or "black", markets for foreign exchange. The
percentages reported in Appendix Table 4 are shares of total
transactions, based on data reported by private dealers to the central
bank and consolidated in Macedo (1986). The shares are considerable both
on the export and on the import side, especially if the premium is taken
into account by converting values into domestic currency. The data is
subject to caveats, since the authorizations to private dealers were
revoked from February 10, 1983 through end of January, 1984, at which
time the commercial banks virtually ceased to deal in foreign exchange
since they would not use the free market rate.
Comparing various sources and methods, Appendix Table 5 reports the
share of unreported transactions. It shows smuggling ratios of .37
(27/100-27) for commodity imports and .49 for commodity exports. The
figures on the bottom panel show the importance of smuggling for
government transactions (cotton, oil, petroleum, sugar) as well as for
livestock.
Appendix Table 6 analyzes the structure of the free market by
currency composition, showing a very dominant but variable share for the
U.S. dollar, and by firm concentration. While the number of authorized
dealers increases substantially during 1984, many of them had a very
small share of the market so that the average number equivalent-27-
Herfindahi index for the year is 5.6. This shows a degree of competition
far greater than generally believed. For example, Dixit (1985) computes
a similar number for U.S. auto firms and finds 2 or 8, depending on
whether divisions are counted as separate entities. Another indicator,
reported in the last column, is average transaction per authorized
dealer. The pattern is erratic, and it would be difficult to ascribe
declines to increases in competition in the usual way. But the size of
the market was very variable due to the emerging bubble and seasonal
factors tend to explain the Summer bulge.
Another piece of evidence concerns remittances. Their importance
for the free market is evident from Appendix Table 5. The reported
figures show a smuggling ratio of about one, confirmed by the figures
based on potential savings reported below, which give 1.11. In a 1983
study of Sudanese workers abroad, discussed by Harris (1986), however,
the smuggling ratio for remittances is as high as 7.27, so that as a
share of output they would represent 37% rather than 5%. Even if such
figure is grossly exaggerated, it seems clear that the stock of foreign
exchange held by Sudanese determines the premium in the short run, as
postulated in our analysis.
Appendix Table 7 shows that the intended use of these remittances
generally requires imports (the exception may be housing). As a
consequence, only a small part of the stock of foreign assets held by
Sudanese residents is directed to supply foreign exchange to the Khartoum
black market. This may account for the low level of net inflows or
outflows reported in Appendix Table 4. Harris (1986) also claims that
the stock -whichhe estimates at $2 billion -isheld outside Sudan but
does not draw the implications for the price of foreign exchange.-28-
Despite the caveats about the quality of the data, this evidence
strongly suggests that smuggling and the free market for foreign exchange
cannot be ignored in the design of official exchange rate policy in
Sudan: the smuggler's blues made its way to the central bank! The black
market has offset the effects of official exchange rate policyleading to
movements in the premium that were determined by stock demand forforeign
assets as well as smuggling activity.
In sum, the failure to match movement in the nominal exchange rate
to relative inflation sharply destabilized the real effective rate after
1980. The attempts at stabilizing the nominal exchange rate destabilized
the real rate, discouraging investment in the traded-goods sectors and
providing inventives for illegal activity. The objective for exchange
rate policy in the Sudan may well be stability, but stability of the real
exchange rate and the black premium premium, not the nominal official
rate against the dollar.—29—
Append ix
Table 1
RELATIvE PRICE INDEX FOR SU0AN 1980 '100
6EORLTRIC AVERAGE
15 COUNTRY WEIGHT 3 COUNTRY
WEIGHT (US:.25.
YEAR LIP INPTOTAL UK:.25.SAUD:.5)
51 55 53 54 55
58 58 56 56 57
59 57 55 54 57
60 56 54 55 56
61 60 57 58
62 59 57 57 60
63 60 58 58 62
64 60 38 38 62
63 56 55 53 60
66 55 54 54 59
67 59 58 58 64
48 51 50 51 56
69 56 54 54 61
70 56 54 54 61
71 54 51 52 59
72 58 53 56 63
73 60 58 St 63
14 64 64 e4 70
13 67 68 70
16 59 61 59
77 63 65 62
78 72 73 71
79 88 89 87
80 100100 100
$1 115115 117
82 136136 141
83 148110 lit
84 1,0196 211
WEIGHTS
COUNTRY IFS CODE EXPORTINPORT TOTAL
USA Iii 0.05410.14910.1230
UK 112 0.04470.17700.1401
FRANCE 1320.05960.05870.0590
GERIIANY 140.0453 0.08980.0830
ITALY 1360.09770.05260.0652
NETNERLAN 1380.03850.05010.0469
SNITZERLA 1460.00970.00000.0027
JAPAN 150 0.09440.05870.0617
YUGOSLAVI 1880.03940.0000 0.0110
KUNAIT 4430.00000.08190.0591
SAUOIA *0 456 0.32370.18510.2238
EGYPT 4690.06450.02020.0313
KOREA 542 0.0122 0.02960. 0247
THAILNI 5700.0103 0.00000.0029
CHINA 9240.08610.0385 0.0518
TOTAL: I•00001.00001•0000
67
60
64
73
89
100
115
136
169
193—30—
Appendix
Table 2
6EOTR1C *VER*6E SUDAN MORINAL EICNAN6ERATE
INDEX: 1980' 100
WEIGHTS 3 COUNTRY
15 COUNTRY WEIGHTS US: .25, U .25
YEAR EXPORT IMPORT TOTAl. SAtioll: .5
CQUITDY IFS CODE EXPORT INPORTTOTAL
USA UI 0.0541 0.1491 0.1230 57 69 óó 67 69
1* 112 0.0447 0.1770 U.1401 58. 69 6* 67 69
FRANCE 132 0.0596 v.05870.0590 59 68 65 oo 6$
6ERMMY 134 0.0653 0.0898 0.0830 60 64 63 63 63
ITALY 136 0.0977 0.0526 0.0652 61 64 62 b2 63
NETHERLANDS 1380.0385 0.05010.0469 62 63 61 62 63
SWITZERLAND 1460.0097 0.00000.0021 63 e3 61 62 63
JAPAN 158 0.0944 0.0587 0.0687 64 62 60 61 63
YU$OSL*YIA 1880.0394 0.00000.0110 65 60 60 60 63
KIJIIAIT U3 0.0000 0.081? 0.0591 66 59 60 60 63
SAUDIAARA$1* 4560.3237 0.1851 0.2238 61 59 60 60
ESYPT 469 0.0645 0.0282 0.0383 68 58 58 58 60
0NE* 542 0.0122 0.0296 0.0247 69 58 58 58 60
THAILANI 578 0.01030.00000.0029 10 58 58 58 60
CIUM 924 0.0861 0.0385 0.0518 71 58 59 59 61
72 62 62 62 64 73 67 66 61 67
74 68 66 66 68
73 48 66 67 67
74 65 62 63 63
71 66 63 64 63
7s 77 73 74 11
79 86 85 85 83
80 100 100 100 100
81 101 101 101 107
82 150 160 160 115
83 203 208 207 22?
84 188 195 193 220—31—
Appendix
Table 3
SUDAN
16HTS REAL.EXCHANGERATE
GEORETRIC AVERAGE
15 COUNTRYNEIGHTS 3 COUNTRY
US: .5. 1*: .25,
COUNTRYIFS CODE EXPORT INPORT TOTALYEAR EXPORT INPORT TOTAL SAUDLA: .5
USA 111 0.0541 0.1497 0.1230
IJX 112 0.0441 0.1770 0.1401 57 125 125 125 126
FRANcE 132 0.0596 0.0587 0.0590 58 118 118 118 120
GERNANY 134 0.0653 0.0898 0.0830 59 119 119 119 121
ITALY 1360.0917 0.0526 0.0632 60 114 116 115 112
NETHERLANDS 1380.0385 0.05030.0469 61 101 108 107 105
S$ITZERLAND 146 0.0097 0.0000 0.0027 62 107 108 108 105
JAPAN 158 0.0944 0.0597 0.0687 63 105 106 106 102
YUGOSLAVIA 89 0.0394 0.0000 0.0110 64 104 104 104 101
LUIIAIT U3 0.0000 0.0919 0.0591 65 108 110 109 105
SAUDIA ARAlIA 456 0.3237 6.1851 0.2238 66 101 112 511 lOG
EGYPT 4690.0645 0.0282 0.0393 67 100 103 102 97
kOREA 5420.01220.0296 0.0247 68 113 116 115 107
THAILAND 379 0.0103 0.0000 0.0029 69 105 108 107 100
ChUM 924 0.0861 0.03*5 0.0511 70 105 109 108 99
71 109 114 113 103
72 lOG 112 113 100
•73 113 114 114 102
74 105 103 104 96
75 102 98 99 96
76 111 102 lOS 100
71 106 97 99 102
78 109 100 102 100
90 96 96 95
80 100 100 100 100
II 10 10 II 92
82 Ui 118 118 124
03 121 123 122 12*
04 90 99 99 104
85—32—
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Table 4
Free Foreign Exchange Transactions (%)
A.As a percentageof "private" current account
Credit Debit
1982 21 11
1983 14 8
1984 19 16
B.As a percentage of "official" current account
Credit Debit
DollarsPounds DollarsPounds
1982 123 187 20 30
1983 48 71 14 21
1984 59 111 17 32
Note: Shares in pounds are obtained by valuing exports at official
rate.
Official commodities are cotton, petroleum, sugar, wheat and
flour.
Sources: Macedo (1986).— .j j—
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Appendix Table 5
Share of Unreported Transactions 1981/82
Debit Credit Net
A.
Trade 27 33 25
Invisibles 33 44
Remittances 100 55 50
Current Account 31 46
B.
Remittancesl] 111
Exports (total =100) weight
Cotton2' 10 54
Oil products2] 2 25
3] Livestock
25 19
Sorghum
Weighted average 13.5 98
Imports
petroieum2] 19 21
sugar2]
Weighted average 13.6 33
Other gov. imports 13.6 12
Private imports 0.0 55
Weighted average 6.1 100
Sources: A. Macedo (1986)
B. El Din and Umbada (1984)
Notes: 1. Adjustment to estimate by Ghol (1982), cited in Source B.,
$2112 remittance/man-year and 400,000 SWA.
Reported remittances from Macedo (1986)
2. Based on difference between contract price and world price
3. Based on direct estimate by Livestock Marketing Public
Corp. (1978)—34—
Appendix
Table 6
Structure of the free foreign
exchange market
A. Size and Currency Composition
Sources (Purchases) Uses (Sales)
Total ($M)Dollar share (%) II Total ($M)Dollar Share (%)
1982 161 82 II 128 79
1983 114 68 II 99 85
1984 175 78 II 193 88
B. Measures of concentration
Number Number equivalentAverage transaction
of dealers Herfindahi index ($million)
1984;2 5 4 1.1
3 5 3 0.9
4 5 3 0.9
5 7 4 1.5
6 9 4 1.2
7 9 6 2.0
8 12 6 2.1
9 13 6 0.8
10 13 7 0.9
11 16 11 2.2
12 19 8 1.0
Sources: Macedo (1986)—35—
Appendix
Table 7
Intended use of
remittances (%)
Investment 28
of which Agriculture (15)
Commerce (9)
Industry C4)
Automobiles 18
Wedding 21
Housing 28
Other 5
100
Source: Sample average of three surveys in 1980-82 reported by El Din
and Umbada (1984)—36—
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